and some residential housing gets sold through English auctions where buyers competitively set the price.
If it were true that negotiations favor the active party (who sets the terms of contract, pricing, etc.) over the passive party (who decides to take it or to leave it), we should expect prices in posted-price markets to favor the party who does the posting. In actual results from prior research, prices in steady state depend on the degree of competition prevailing on the respective sides of the market. The direction of convergence to the neighborhood of equilibrium prices depends not only on the negotiating mechanism but also on the relative size of consumer and producer surpluses.
Most people sign apartment leases full of pages of fine print, just as authors sign copyright transfer forms to publishers. These forms often include articles that may be quite unreasonable. A publisher recently asked me sign a form that included the author indemnifying the publisher against the cost of any legal defense and consequences of libel, defamation, etc., as a result of publishing my article. Since my net worth could not pay for more than a few hours of their lawyers' labor, I asked the publisher to have the lawyer review my article to suggest alterations to eliminate the risk of lawsuits. I never heard back from the publisher; they went ahead and published the article.
I suppose the author has in mind the situations in which most renters or authors do not take the time to read the provisions included in the printed form. Even if they do, it is too cumbersome to ask for changes. Surely, the clerk will say, "I did not write this form." And there is no clerk to talk to when we click the "I agree" box on a long and unread user agreement for software of almost any kind.
But this is, essentially, an economic choice in which one trades off some immediate time and convenience against the risk of an (apparently unlikely, but in reality unknown) chance of signing an unreasonable or unacceptable provision included in the contract. Before the outcome of this process is labeled exploitative, it seems two questions need to be addressed: Are there any corresponding advantages to the passive party in such form-adhesive contracts? What is the effect of such contracts on the division of surplus between the two parties (as compared to alternative forms)?
The lease and copyright transfer forms, laws and services of a city, and department store prices may appear rigid and rigged against the consumer. Yet, as Charles M. Tiebout (1956) suggested in his "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," even localities compete, and people move from one city to another. Form-adhesive contracts can be seen as a way for the sellers to show their wares, so to speak, to allow their customers to make choices among the offerings. The fact that most customers do not look at various alternatives is akin to the fact that most people do not visit different grocery stores to buy apples and oranges. It is a matter of cost and time. Also, any negotiating disadvantage to the customer is associated with an information advantage: form-adhesive contracts require the contract writer to share a lot of information but require the other party to reveal little or nothing.
The idea of form-adhesive contract seems to be based on the assumption that the costs of bargaining, negotiation, and search do not exist, or are trivial. Imagine the cost to the landlords, and ultimately the renters, if the terms of each apartment lease were to be individually negotiated. A lawyer might have to be present not only to negotiate each deal, but also to advise whether the landlord should send a plumber to apartment number 1239 when a midnight call about a bathroom leak is received. Without form-adhesive contract, every renter could have a unique set of terms. National laws also are "form-adhesive," probably because the cost of individually negotiating the tax laws with each citizen would not only be prohibitive, but be ultimately unfair.
In addition to the language of exploitation and sociology, economics offers another way of looking at form-adhesive contracts that may be useful. The present paper (and the literature of which it is a part) tries to identify if active choice and prompting by moral or social suggestion have an effect on compliance. While such a question is interesting, my preference would have been to first ask: what difference do formadhesive contracts make to the welfare of the participants? The setup of the paper seems to assume an answer to that question. If the question is already settled, an appropriate reference should be added.
The experiment itself is carefully designed. There is literature on participatory budgeting, beginning in the 1960s, on the influence of participation on compliance with budgets in organizations. This work seems highly relevant to, and consistent with, the findings of the paper. Participation usually brings not only greater acceptance but also greater comprehension of the terms. Whether this increase in comprehension will justify Microsoft negotiating a contract with each of us for the use of the Windows operating system is not addressed.
When such questions are addressed, I would not be surprised to find that formadhesive contracts get used mostly when doing so enhances social welfare. The research could also help us identify situations where that is not true, and thus make a case for reform in specific circumstances.
